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Will, which implies a perfect harmony between the Moral Law and the Will, and hence no compulsion, can never be reached by us. Kant loses no occasion to insist that this conception of Duty must be held in its strict purity as an absolute compulsion, and that it is both absurd and harmful, as leading to *Schwaermerei*,* to teach that morality ought to be practised for the love of it. It is absurd to require love for a command, and it is harmful to mix up a pathological affection with the highest manifestation of reason, with that which has its ground in absolute freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature: duty for the mere sake of duty! "The venerable character of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own peculiar law and its own peculiar tribunal. Nay, even if we should try ever so much to mix both together like medicines, in order to give the draught thus mixed to the sick soul, they yet will immediately separate of themselves; and if they do not separate, then the former will not operate at all. But even if physical life should gain some strength by this mixture, moral life would die out beyond redemption."

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. B  nard, by J. A. MARSH.

II. We understand the nature of poetry in general and that of the poetic thought, the characteristics which distinguish the works of poetry from other productions of the human intelligence. We must now approach the questions relating to *expression* or to *poetic language*. This subject, which occupies so much space in ordinary treatises upon poetry, should not be neglected in a philosophic theory. Hegel bestows upon it all the attention which it merits. Without entering into the technical details of a treatise on versification, he seeks to give an account of the necessity of poetic language and of its forms, and proceeds then to a learned analysis of

* Carlyle has done little service to an introduction of this word into the English language by giving *Swarmery* as its equivalent. *Schwaermerei* is a transcending of the limits of reason practised on principle.

the two principal systems of versification which have for bases the one, rhythm, and the other rhyme, of *rhythmic* versification and *rhymed* versification.

Let us follow him in this interesting research, whose merit consists, above all, in showing throughout the necessary agreement of the forms of language with the modes of thought which they are designed to express.

The origin of poetic language ought to be sought, neither in the choice of words nor in their combination and the harmony of rhythm or rhymes, but in the manner in which the imagination itself conceives objects—that is to say, in the nature of the poetic thought.

Hence the necessity of considering, in the first place, the *poetic image* in the spirit, and the form which it takes therefrom, before passing into discourse. Then alone will it be proper to consider expression from its grammatical side, the particular turns which affect poetic diction in opposition to prose; to study, finally, versification, which is the musical part of it.

We know that the peculiarity of poetic thought is to be figurative; to present itself to the spirit accompanied by an image which represents objects not in an abstract manner, but concrete and living. The idea and the sensuous form appear to us simultaneously, as forming a single whole, which is the poetic image itself. It is, in fact, the essence of poetry, as of art in general, to represent to us ideas under sensuous forms, the species or the type in a living individuality. Just so the poetic image presents the inmost sense of things, their idea, combined with the richness of the forms of nature.

The first effect of this image is to detain the spirit with the external form, to interest us in it as expressing the thing in its living reality, to give to it importance, to heighten and embellish it. Also, poetic thought affects, in its language, the form of periphrasis: it describes an attribute, a characteristic accessory, as an ornament designed to elevate the object, to picture it, to draw a clear and vivid image of it in the spirit. Epithets—those of Homer in particular—which frequently appear insignificant, and recur unceasingly, have this design of figuring forth the objects and of engraving their image in our thought.

Such figurative expression is not, therefore, unessential. Unessential expression describes an object by name of another, through an analogy which exists between them. Such are metaphor and comparison. They are simply ornaments. Expression proper does more: it characterizes. Its images, borrowed from nature, serve to develop, to explain thought. Fashioned by the spirit, they show its richness and productivity. The metaphorical employment of language becomes itself an end: the imagination amuses itself in showing its genius and fecundity. It embellishes itself with ornaments, and delights in its peculiar activity, which it displays on all sides.

To poetic expression is opposed prosaic expression. Here the image loses its value. In this, the sense, the idea is the essential and the end. It may still be useful for indicating with force and vivacity the external side of objects; but this is not done when we design to paint thought. Fidelity and clearness form the first or only law of language. In poetry, exactness and perfect conformity of expression to the simple thought are not the principal objects. It must, first of all, conduct us into a sphere where sensuous forms furnish a body for ideas. The spirit, attaching itself to the image, in this living form, finds itself free from the exclusive preoccupation of the idea. It inhabits two worlds at once, the world of sense and that of thought.

In simple (*naïve*) epochs this language, wholly of images, is easy: thought naturally puts on this figurative form. In the ages of reflection, where logical and prosaic habits rule, poetry has need of a premeditated energy in order to liberate itself from abstract formulas, and to re-establish the harmony of the faculties of the soul.

If we now consider poetic language in itself in its *form* and its *grammatical* structure, a few words will suffice to characterize it.

1°. There exists, above all, in certain idioms, a wholly poetic vocabulary. There are particular forms of speech in poetry, strange to common use, nobler terms, expressions new or borrowed from the old language. The great poets reveal thus the power of their genius in creating new words, in fixing, in ennobling the vulgar language.

2°. The disposition of words, the signs of language, poetic turns, inversions contrary to logical arrangement, and blunt, vivid expressions, offer means full of resources.

3°. The period, with its simple or complete texture, its movement gentle or rapid, its unexpected transitions, corresponds to analogous movements of thought.

We should distinguish, in the epochs of language, the same difference as in those of poetic thought. A simple, natural, vivid, original, ingenuous manner of expression characterizes primitive epochs. The speech of the poet is then itself something new, which awakens admiration: it is a living creation, a species of revelation. There are none of the trite and common forms which mediocrity and the spirit of imitation make use of, a sort of current money whose stamp is worn off. Nor does one find there any of those artifices of language, those nice shadings, those adroit transitions which characterize the development of art and language in later ages; but a simple, ingenuous, original and strong diction—a natural, energetic expression, full of freshness and brilliancy. The precise distinctions between that which is vulgar and that which is noble does not yet exist. The language is rich, although simple; figurative, and not charged with metaphors. Such is the language of Homer and Dante.

Later, when combinations of thought are multiplied, language affects a more deliberate and more skilful movement, and poetry takes a different position as opposed to prose. It is then that their distinction appears well defined. The poet is compelled to elevate himself above ordinary language. Other conditions are imposed upon him: the artistic calm, the sentiment of harmony, the demands of good taste, more toil, and disguised effort. Then, too, a poetic production, because of these very difficulties, may make of the form of the language a principal object. We seek polish, elegance, and the effects of rhetorical style. Throughout these the toil of reflection, applied to the perfecting of the form, becomes felt. Such is the character of certain epochs and of the poetry of certain nations. True poetic diction escapes the two extremes. While wholly admitting the pleasure of a learned structure and of a beautiful style, it abstains from declamatory rhetoric and false elegance; it observes an exact admeasurement. The content

is not forgotten for the form; but the two elaborated, each for the other, make only one. A harmonious, true, living language seems to have sprung from the thing itself.

The third side of poetic language, distinct from image and diction properly so called, is versification. Without it, it is true, the thought, the language even, can be poetic; but they have not their true form; the musical element is lacking.

The necessity of versification, as an essential form of poetic language, is easy to demonstrate. Poetry is the art-form of speech. Speech is composed of sounds: it has this in common with music. These signs, no doubt, are signs which represent thoughts and images. They are, not the less, materials of art. As such they strike the ear more or less harmoniously. Now, since they appertain to art, they fall under its laws. The Beautiful here is harmony. Measure or rhyme is, then, absolutely indispensable. They introduce us into a world into which we can enter only by abandoning the habits of prose. The poet is compelled to move outside the limits of ordinary language.

That is, then, a superficial and false theory which has wished to banish versification from poetry under the pretext of making it more natural and free. The Natural, the True, here, is the Beautiful; it is harmony: the False is the Real; it is prose. Undoubtedly, the making of verse may be a shackle for thought; but these bonds are the laws of art themselves. The true poet bears this yoke easily; far from cramping the flight of his thought, this necessity sustains it, elevates it, excites it; it favors inspiration. Those who cannot talk this language are not true poets. Poetic prose is bastard and spurious. The sound of words, that material element of poetry, should not remain unformed; it should be fashioned according to the laws of harmony. Thereby language tempers the gravity of thought; it transports the poet and the auditor into a superior sphere, where grace and serenity reign. Just as in music, rhythm and melody ought to harmonize with the subject; versification ought to conform itself to the movement and character of the thoughts. The measure of the verse should reproduce the tone and the spirit of the whole poem.

After having thus demonstrated the necessity of versification in poetry, Hegel devotes himself to characterizing the two

great systems of versification which are adapted to ancient poetry and to modern poetry.

We shall not follow him in the parallel which he establishes between the two systems, of which the one has rhythm, the other rhyme for its basis, but shall confine ourselves to marking their general characters.

The system of *rhythmic versification* rests upon the duration of sounds, and the measure of long and short syllables. The accent, the cæsure, which give to verse more animation and variety, depend equally upon the external side of language, not upon the very sense of the words and the intonation which it determines. The words do not attract attention because of their signification, but through their external form. Accent and rhythm are independent of sense and thought. In modern versification, on the contrary, it is no longer the duration of sounds or the quantity which is the basis. They still preserve some importance; but the principle of measure is not now the length or shortness of syllables; it is their number, and even the sense which is attached to words. The expression concentrates itself upon the radical syllable, which draws the attention to it. The *signification*—in that, definitively, is the preponderating reason which determines the value of syllables. Thus the form of verse assumes a character less material and more spiritual.

As consequence of this principle, the expression, concentrating itself upon the radical syllable of words, in which, above all, their signification resides, and not upon the general form of words, it follows that the learned combination of modes and flexions which constitutes the rhythmic system is broken up. Hence, all fixed rules about the feet of verse, solely regulated by quantity, disappears, and the whole system which depends upon the measurement of time is necessarily destroyed. There is no more occasion to measure syllables, but to *count* them, to calculate their number, as in French and Italian verse.

Rhyme is the only possible compensation for the loss of these advantages. As the duration no longer co-ordinates and regulates itself, nor, on the other hand, is the spiritual sense found in the radical syllables, there is nothing else remaining, as material element, freed from the measurement of time

and the accentuation of syllables, than the sound itself of the syllables equally and alternately repeated.

What conditions must rhyme fulfil to answer to this condition?

In the first place, in order to draw attention and to make compensation for the cadenced sound of syllables in discourse, or for the organized measure of verse, this sound ought to be much more thoroughly marked. It needs, also, counterpoises to accentuation and to the signification of words. In opposition to the delicate movements of rhythmic harmony, rhyme would then be an external agreement which has no need of a finely practised ear such as Greek verse exacts.

Rhyme, in this respect, appears somewhat more material than the metre in rhythmic versification. But, from another side, the more abstract principle of the repetition of equal and exact sounds, in the rhymic harmony of words, is more favorable to thought, and invites more to reflection. The spirit is not distracted by that music of language which turns solely upon the external feature of the duration of sounds and their cadenced movement. The attention of spirit and ear is drawn simply to the repetition of similar sounds, a return in which the soul recognizes itself and satisfies itself as in a reflex of its own identity. The system of ancient versification has the more plastic character, rhyme the more profound and emotional. We find here the difference in character between classic and romantic poetry.

It is not, in fact, by accident or by artificial invention that this change is effected, and that the new system of versification has succeeded the ancient. The depth of modern feeling and thought demand an analagous form of versification. Unquestionably this revolution has its principle in the nature of modern idioms, but they represent the modern thought itself. The languages of the north are distinguished by their sentimental and spiritual character. Their inner structure, their laws, are its consequences. The two systems may, up to a certain point, coalesce; and many idioms—the German, for example—lend themselves to this alliance. But the rhythmic element subordinates itself, and is only accessory. The reason is easy to comprehend. Rhythmic versification, resting solely upon the length and shortness of syllables, has a fixed

measure, independent of the signification of words. Modern idioms, on the other hand, are deprived of this natural measure, because the verbal accent given by the signification may render a short syllable long and *vice versa*. All, then, becomes uncertain and unsteady: nothing fixed, compact, solid. The spirit is liberated from that material and temporal side of quantity and mathematical laws which distinguish ancient idioms, or that element has become purely accessory. Thus conformably to the nature of modern thought and language, it is not possible to attain to the plasticity of antique metre. Those who have believed in it have tried it to no purpose. If we wish to combine the two systems, the only compensation is the accent of the verse and the cæsure, which, combining itself with the verbal accent, stands out in a most expressive manner. But this means is itself imperfect.

III. From the exposition of the general principles of poetry, Hegel passes to the examination of the *different varieties* which it allows, and which serve to class its works. Without entering into the study of accessory forms and particular rules which belong to a course of literature, he devotes himself to observing the real nature and the essential characteristics of the principal varieties—*epic*, *lyric*, and *dramatic* poetry. Each of these forms of poetry is the object of a profound and elaborate theory, wherein it is studied in itself and in its connection with the two others. It remains for us to follow the author in this part of his work, which interests the scholar no less than the philosopher.

Observe how the three varieties characterize themselves, and how the division which comprehends them justifies itself.

In the first place, poetry presents to us a picture of the moral world in its external existence. It represents it under the form of a great action in which gods and men take part, and which evolves itself in the midst of a vast complication of particular incidents. That variety which recalls the figurative arts reveals to us the *objective*, impersonal side of existence, in this sense, that the action which makes its content takes the form of an event in the presence of which the poet sinks himself, and which accomplishes itself independently of the

will of men by an external fatality. Such is the general character of *epic poetry*.

To the epic is opposed *lyric poetry*. Its character is personal or subjective. It represents the inner world of the soul, its sentiments, its conceptions, its joys, and its sufferings. It is his personal thought, as profound and true, which the poet expresses as his proper disposition, the living and inspired production of his spirit.

Dramatic poetry combines the two preceding characteristics. Like epic poetry, it represents an action in its successive phases, together with the personages who play a part in it. But this action, in place of being determined by general causes and an external fatality, seems to come forth alive from the will of the characters, who themselves create for themselves their peculiar destiny. In place of a calm and equable recital of a past event, it is a vision which is given to our eyes by the means of actions and the accessories of scenic representation.

These three varieties embrace all poetry. The others are either mixed varieties or modifications of the preceding. The latter differ from the former only to approach prose, as do didactic and descriptive poetry.

EPIC POETRY.—Epic poetry should, in the first place, be considered in its *general character*.

Many inferior sorts may prepare us to comprehend the epic, properly so called; they are, *the epigram, the ancient elegy, gnostic poetry, cosmogonic or philosophic poems*. These forms of poetry may be considered as belonging to the epic variety in this, that the fact, or the idea which is the content of the poem, is presented for its own sake, without the poet's mingling therewith his reflections, his personal sentiments. The discourse (ἔπος) and the subject make but one thing. It is sometimes the expression of a fact accomplished (*epigram*), sometimes a series of maxims and sentences (*gnomic poetry*) where moral truth is strongly characterized, sometimes descriptions of grand scenes of nature, the recital of the origin of things and the revolutions of nature, or the poetic expression of the laws of the universe and the first speculations of science. But all these productions, although they have the epic tone, do not constitute the true epic.

"This has for subject a past action, an event which, in the vast compass of its circumstances and the richness of its relations, embraces a whole world; the life of a nation and the history of an entire epoch." It is the national book, and, like the Bible of a people, it presents a faithful and complete picture of its genius, its manners, and its character.

As presenting the artless thought of a nation under the poetic form, the true epic poem appears at an era intermediate between the barbarous and the civilized state. Later, when the individual spirit has detached itself from the general thought, when a political organization and fixed laws have established themselves, the soul creates for itself a distinct and independent world; it enters into itself and conceives an ideal from reflection and sentiment. The poet expresses lyrically his personal impressions. As this individual force increases, and as the sentiment of personality becomes marked in the character and the passions, the necessity of representing this principle leads to *dramatic* poetry.

We shall, nevertheless, distinguish the heroic age, which furnishes the material for the epic, from the era in which the epic poem takes its rise. Homer and his poems are many ages later than the war of Troy. But in spite of the distance which separates the poet from his subject, a strict connection should subsist between them; he must live again in similar ideas, manners, and beliefs; without this his work affords a striking contradiction between present and past ideas. It is only a learned combination, the effort of a skilled reflection, without proper sap or vitality. The learned epic displaces the primitive epic.

We see from this the qualities and the position of the epic poet.

Although the epic may be the faithful picture of the civilization of a people, it is none the less the free product of individual thought. In such a work appears all the boldness of creation of a man of genius, who is inspired with the events, with the spirit and the character of his nation and of his time. It is necessary that the poet, in order to be the interpreter of general thought, necessarily vague, give to it a more precise form; that he be conscious of himself and of the freedom of his genius. Otherwise he cannot realize so grand a work. But in spite of the independence of his creations, he should remain

national in the ideas, the passions, the characters of his personages, and thus in the coloring of his pictures. It is necessary that the nation recognize itself in him, and his work be the image of its spirit.

Because of this objective character of the epic, the poet ought to sink himself in the presence of his subject, to absorb himself completely in the world which he unfolds to our eyes. In such a work created by his imagination, in which he has placed his soul and his genius, nowhere ought his person and his hand directly to betray themselves. The poem seems to sing itself. The edifice rears itself; the architect remains invisible.

But an epic poem should not the less be the work of a single man. We cannot stand up too strongly against the opinion which considers, for example, the poems of Homer as a succession of songs collected, and afterwards arranged, as a collection of rhapsodies. Such an hypothesis is counter to the very notion of art. Every work of art, in fact, explains itself only through the original thought of a single individual. The spirit of the age, of the nation, is the general cause, the basis of his work; but this spirit must concentrate itself in the individual genius of the artist or poet who inspires himself with it. A poem is an organic whole; only a single man can conceive and organize a uniform whole. Unity, that supreme law of art, exacts a homogeneous thought, an intelligence which conceives and develops it. The contrary opinion is barbarous; and when we reduce it to its just value, we see that what it has of truth is this, that the poet sinks himself in the presence of his work which is to be his most beautiful panegyric.

B. If from the general characteristics we pass to examine the *particular characteristics* which distinguish epic poetry, the principal points to be considered are:

1°. The state of civilization suited to the epic; 2°. the nature of epic *action*, its personages and their character, the movement and the development of the action, the superior powers which direct it and determine its *dénouement*; 3°. lastly, the unity of the epic poem in its totality and its general development.

1°. As to what concerns the *social form proper to the epic*, that subject has already been treated in the first part, in con-

nection with the determination of the *ideal*. It is sufficient to recall what was then said, adding thereto some new considerations.

The state of society suitable as a foundation for the epic, is what we may term the *heroic* age. It is an epic where the ethical life, the organization of the family and the nation, present already a certain degree of development, but not a regular and fixed form. A positive constitution and legislation take from the personages their independence and the spontaneity of their character.

Perfect liberty of action and of will, joined to a simple life which permits man to preserve his relations with nature, and to display his activity in enjoying its productions or in combatting its obstacles—this is what characterizes the existence of heroes. It is an intermediate state between barbarous and the prose of civilized life, where all is regulated, arranged,—where each has his function and his appointed place. There is no fixed hierarchy to establish relations of dependence and obedience essentially adverse to the individuality of epic figures.

The picture of this social state must, furthermore, embrace the entirety of national knowledges, the richest and most varied painting of the manners of foreign peoples. It is thus that Homer places under our eyes, all the earth and the whole of human life painted on the shield of Achilles, with the usages, the legislation, and the marriages, or a complete abridgment of human knowledge.

Nevertheless it is always the national character, the particular spirit of the nation, which should reflect itself in it. In this respect the epic is the Bible of a people, its book, as immortal as itself. Such is the reason of the enduring interest which it excites. It is the living image of this people, reproducing all its traits, moral, religious, political, and physical. This it is which constitutes the immortal interest of the works of Homer, independently of the beauty of the composition.

2°. To describe this form of society is not, for all that, the object of the epic poem. It is only the foundation on which an event develops itself—that is to say, the *epic action*. This action should be determined by moral causes of the highest order, and accomplished by the *dramatis personæ*. The epic

world must then be seized in such a particular *situation* as gives birth to action, in a *collision*.

What should be the nature of this collision compared with dramatic collisions?

The situation most proper for epic action is the *state of war*—that is to say, a conflict between peoples. War shows a nation wholly in movement; it is at the same time the grandest occasion which it has for coming to an understanding with itself, obliged as it is to display all its energies in a heroic effort. Further, this is the object of all the great epics. War-like courage is the principal interest. Bravery is a quality of the soul which has need of a vast field of action; it reveals the natural side of character rather than the pathetic side of its passion; and it pursues ends which incline it to recount rather than to represent. In the epic, the works of the will and the chances of events ought to coalesce; just as, in the drama, the march of the action and its *denouement* explain themselves through the motives and the characters of the *dramatis personæ*.

These situations open a vast field for the epic. It is to be remarked, further, that the situations truly epic are the wars of nations foreign to each other. Subjects taken from civil wars, like the *Pharsalia* of Lucan, and the *Henriade*, have not been successful. The conflict of political parties is more favorable to the drama than to the epic, for these events lose their grandeur and clearness: they become embroiled and entangled, and leave too large a field for intrigue. A struggle for the position and the integrity of a nation, of a race, is alone worthy of an epic.

Let us add to this the defense of a just cause, the vindication of a universal right. Then only the spectacle of a great enterprise, not an arbitrary and personal plan of conquest, unfolds itself to our vision: an event of sublime necessity which takes place in the order of the world—such is the subject of all the great epics.

The content of the epic is then a national enterprise, on which the character and genius of a nation imprints itself. This enterprise should have a determinate end, certain motives, to be realized under the form of events and through certain personages. This constitutes *epic action*. It presents

two aspects: the internal side, the end, the motives; and the external side, the physical and moral circumstances which appear as obstacles or means. That which distinguishes an *action*, properly so called, from an *event*, is, that in the former the internal side predominates; while in an event the external preserves its absolute right.

Now the problem of epic poetry consists in representing the principal action as an event or series of events, consequently in according to external circumstances the same importance as to the will of the personages.

As to the nature itself of the aim of the action, that aim in the epic cannot be an abstract idea, like the state, the native country, but something living and individual. The enterprise must have for motive the will, the misfortune, the exploit of a particular hero, an insult to avenge, a right to vindicate, love, etc. Without this, events appear in their frigid succession, as in a history of a people. This is the reason why epics where one has wished to represent the history of the whole world do not furnish real interest. They lack the character of individuality which is essential to art. An action of which the world is the theatre and humanity the hero presents nothing precise to the imagination. It is a frigid allegory, a phantasmagoria where grand historic figures pass an instant before the eyes to disappear and make room for others which the flood of time brings on forever.

Epic action, then, can attain the poetic vitality only as it concentrates itself in a single hero, who marches at the head of events and to whose person they attach themselves.

As to the *personages of the epic*, whose actions, interests, misfortunes and destiny, form, as in the drama, the principal interest, it is important to mark with precision the distinction between them and *dramatic* personages.

In the epic the principal figures should present a combination of the traits which represent completely human nature and the national character. Such are Achilles and the *Cid*. Tragic characters may have in reality an equal richness; but the action being confined in narrow limits, an equal variety cannot be developed. This would be impossible and superfluous. The epic hero represents an entire people, an entire form of civilization. He belongs to a period of simplicity where

the whole character exhibits itself. The natural has the largest place in him. The moral has little right to demand account of his acts and his passions. Such is Achilles. Such noble persons take up into themselves, with glory, whatever is scattered through the national character—its defects as well as its positive qualities.

Dramatic characters are not thus exalted nor thus complete. They do not reach that elevation where all that was at the base becomes concentrated and completed in a summit. The aim is more personal—the motives more individual.

Another difference is this, that the dramatic personage concentrates all his energy into the pursuit of one end. Now this constant preoccupation with a single aim is foreign to the heroes of the epic poem. They accomplish their destiny; but events, external circumstances, effect as much as they. Obstacles, dangers, adventures, do not arise so directly from the action itself as in the drama. They rather produce themselves for his occasion.

Other differences cause themselves to be remarked in the *form of events*, their *progress*, the *necessity* which determines them, and the general powers which govern them.

In the drama, as has been remarked, the passion or the will of the personages is the essential principle which determines their destiny. The events appear to depend on their character and the ends which they pursue. And, too, the principal interest concentrates itself on the ethical side of the action. External circumstances have no value except through the advantage which the personages themselves reap from them. In the epic, events, external accidents, and actions emanating from the will of personages, have equal importance. Human actions assimilate themselves to events which evolve themselves under our eyes. Thus the personage is not free; he is thrown into the midst of a vast complication of events, in appearance controlled by chance; in reality ruled by necessity.

And now appears an essential difference upon this important point of *fatality* or *destiny*.

The dramatic personage himself creates his own destiny. The destiny of the epic hero is the result of the force of things. The power of circumstances imprints upon the action its particular movement and determines the issue of events. There

remains for man only to follow that fatal and necessary order, and to suffer his doom. The spectacle which presents itself to our view is that of a grand general situation. This fatality is also a providential justice. Still, man is less judged in his acts, as a moral person, than in the things which he personifies. The grandeur of the events crushes the individuals, who themselves represent races or peoples. There hovers also a tone of sadness over all. That which is most noble is condemned to perish. Such is the destiny of Achilles, of Hector, of the heroes involved in the destruction of Troy, or dispersed after its fall.

This necessity may be represented in various ways. Sometimes it springs from a single exhibition of the action. The general tone of the recital causes us to feel that it concerns itself with events whose necessity is the effect of a mysterious power. Sometimes the poet places over the actions of men certain superior divinities who govern and direct their course, by their will and their decrees.

This is the Marvelous, properly so called. But it is necessary also to state the nature of the Marvelous in the epic.

A rule already established elsewhere is, that, in the combined action of gods and men, there must be maintained the poetic relation of respective independence, without which the gods are abstractions, or the men instruments, machines. This is the defect of the Indian epics. The Greek epic has resolved the problem in the happiest manner: it presents this harmonious fusion of the human will and the divine will. The heroes and the divinities preserve an immovable power and an individual liberty perfectly independent.

We must here insist upon the distinction of *primitive* epics and *artificial* or learned epics; the first, where the poet is still in harmony with the beliefs of the epic which he traces; the second, where his beliefs are different from those of the world which he wishes to represent. Thus in Homer the gods float in a magic light between reality and fiction. The Marvelous presents a solid, substantial, true character.

It is the property of a fresh and simple imagination to communicate to the Marvelous this stamp of naturalness and truth. The divinities of Virgil, compared with the gods of Homer, are certain imaginary beings coldly invented or imitated, a

kind of artistic machine. The Marvelous in modern epics, in the *Paradise Lost*, the *Henriade*, the *Messiah*, etc., is also far from this truth. The poem of Klopstock, in particular, is full of abstract fictions, which, in spite of beauties of the first order, render the reading of it fatiguing.

3°. After having considered the epic poem in relation to the action which forms its content, the personages which play a part in it, and the superior powers which direct its events, there is left for us to examine it as a whole, in its *mode of organization* and its *unity*, as also in its movement and its development. It is here, above all, that the principal rules of the epic have their place.

The basis of epic action is the entire world of the nation : this, like the idea of a picture, is the ground-plan. Above appear the gods who direct the action. Upon an intermediate plane there is delineated the picture of human life, public and private. Upon the foreground appear the personages, with their sentiments, their designs, their passions. All these parts ought to be strongly bound together, not to remain isolated.

Now the bond of *unity*, the centre, is the particular event of which the epic traces the development, the limited action to which all the details attach themselves.

Through this the poem presents individuality, richness, life, and unity. The recital is not a simple description of different objects. The particular event absorbs the national idea no further than that the latter appears simply in the service of the action.

The general rule is that the two sides, the particular action and the general picture, be so combined, that they preserve, in spite of their reciprocity, an independence which permits them to develop themselves in free harmony. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* furnish us models. The anger of Achilles, which is the centre of the action, suffers events to evolve themselves freely. The voyage of Ulysses presents the same spectacle in a variety of adventures related to the same end, and which seem to succeed each other at random.

As to the individual action itself, in order that it may have unity, there is necessary to it in the first place a definite point of departure. A general collision does not suffice. Thus for the *Iliad*, though the Trojan war is the basis, the poem com-

mences with the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon. The action is thereby confined within a clearly traced circle.

The point of departure fixed, what is the *mode of development* which befits it? If one wishes here again to remark the differences between epic and dramatic poetry, the principal points to be considered are: 1°. *the extent of the epic poem*; 2°. *the connection of the various parts and the episodes*; 3°. *the manner of contriving the movement of events*.

In order to resume in general the development of epic action, particularly in opposition to dramatic poetry, to render account both of its extent and of the progress of events towards the final consummation, we ought to say that the evolution in the epic poem not only delays for the description of external circumstances and ethical situations, but also in other respects it opposes itself to the *denouement*. It retards in particular by *episodes* the accomplishment of the particular aim, which dramatic poetry may not lose from sight an instant amid the conflicts which continue without interruption in a logical and consequent manner. But it is not necessary that such obstacles should appear like means employed for an external end. The entire course of events ought to spring out of itself by the force of circumstances, and this by an original design, distinct from the personal intentions of the poet.

In concluding, it is proper to state precisely what constitutes *unity of action* in the epic poem.

We have already refuted the opinion which pretends that the epic poem is formed by the successive addition of many songs which may continue indefinitely. The falsity of this becomes manifest when we comprehend perfectly the nature of the unity which constitutes the essence of the epic work, just as of every work of art in general.

Unity is not a vague and common term. Each event may, it is true, prolong itself indefinitely, may extend into the past and into the future. If, then, one only has regard to succession, or even to the connection of facts, the epic could have neither beginning nor end. The exemplification of this is given us in cyclic poems, prosaic works compared with those of Homer.

The error arises from this, that there is no clear idea of the nature of an action, and of the difference which there is be-

tween an action and a simple fact. Facts interlink or succeed one another. In order to an action there is needful something more than a similar external bond; action presupposes a determinate *end* and motives. Thus an end clearly conceived, and a motive in like manner determined, which pushes the personage to the completion of that end—this is what constitutes an action. Hence the realization of this action has a significance, a determined character, a beginning, a middle, and an end. The passions, the character of the persons, the situations, the events, are attached to a common idea. The action has a centre towards which converge all the parts of the poem. All which does not strictly belong thereto ought to be excluded.

The anger of Achilles, in the *Iliad*, is the centre of the poem, the fact to which all the events attach themselves.

Thus what constitutes the unity of the epic, is an individual action having a determinate and precise end, a comprehended motive of the personages, whose accomplishment thenceforth has a beginning, a middle, and an end.

In what, then, differs the unity of epic from that of dramatic action? The difference has been already remarked above. In the epic, the action develops itself from the bosom of a vast national unity. This introduces into the representation a multiplicity of situations and events which the drama does not admit of. This is a vaster picture; herein a whole world reflects itself. The unity here is complete only when, on the one side, the particular action is achieved; and when, on the other side, the entire world wherein it moves is represented in its perfect wholeness; which opens an immense career, and permits a great variety of episodes.

C. This exposition of the principles of the epic concludes by indicating some inferior varieties which belong to it, such as the *idyl*, the *pastoral*, the *descriptive* poem, which have already been spoken of elsewhere. But the variety which approaches the nearest is the romance, which Hegel characterizes thus:

The *novel* is the *social epic*. It presupposes a prosaically organized society, and its aim is to restore to poetry its lost rights. Its content is the collision between the poetry of the heart and the prose of the social relations. It is a protest

against the actual organization of society, an effort to substitute for this prose of reality a form which approaches more nearly to the beauty of art. The novel demands, like the epic, the painting of an entire world, and the picture of real life. As to the conception and the execution, the career of the novelist is freer, since, though in his descriptions he cannot dispense with the prose of real life, he is not himself obliged to remain in the prosaic and the vulgar.

After developing this theory, the author, in a rapid sketch, traces the *development of epic poetry*, and briefly characterizes the great poems of this class which belong to the principal epochs and the different historical nations.

OUTLINES OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

[In 1840, the Editors of Hegel's works published a small volume with the title, *HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL PROPÆDEUTICS*. The work, which was edited by Karl Rosenkranz, contains substantially the original outline of the Course of Instruction in Philosophy which Hegel gave at the Gymnasium at Nürnberg in 1808-1811, together with sundry additions made from notes taken at the lectures and other sources. We give the entire exposition of the Phenomenology as it occurs in the second year of the course. (The entire course was divided into three years: *1st year*, Science of Rights, of Morals, and of Religion; *2d year*, Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic; *3d year*, Science of the Idea and Philosophical Encyclopædia. The whole is preceded by an admirable preface by the Editor.) After the three Parts of Hegel's Phenomenology which we gave in Volume II. of this Journal, it seemed well to give an outline of the whole subject in order to assist the reader in his labors upon the third (Force and Understanding). Nothing so much restores confidence after hard and apparently fruitless study of the detailed dialectical procedure as a short and clear outline. It seems like a gleam of light, and sometimes suggests at once the significance of the whole.—EDITOR.]

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Our ordinary Knowing has before itself only the object which it knows, but does not at first make an object of itself, i. e. of the Knowing. But the whole which is extant in the act of knowing is not the object alone, but also the Ego that knows, and the relation of the Ego and the object to each other, i. e. Consciousness.